Chapter 2: Other schools of thought examined

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्

racanānupapatteśca nānumānam

The pradhana inferred by Sankhya cannot be the cause of the world, since insentient matter cannot produce this orderly design. This pada examines other schools on their own reasoning.

प्रवृत्तेश्च

pravṛtteśca

And because of activity: insentient things do not move to act unless guided by an intelligent being, as a chariot needs a driver.

पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि

payo'mbuvaccettatrāpi

If it is said that pradhana acts by itself like milk flowing for the calf or water flowing downhill, there too intelligence guides it.

व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात्

vyatirekānavasthiteścānapekṣatvāt

And because pradhana, having nothing outside it to depend on, could not be sometimes active and sometimes at rest. Its creating and dissolving would have no reason.

अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत्

anyatrābhāvācca na tṛṇādivat

Nor does pradhana change spontaneously like grass into milk, because grass becomes milk only when eaten by a cow, not elsewhere.

अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात्

abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt

Even if its spontaneous activity were granted, it would have no purpose, since neither enjoyment nor liberation of the Purusha could be its aim.

पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि

puruṣāśmavaditi cettathāpi

If it is said the Purusha moves pradhana as a lame man guides a blind one or a magnet moves iron, still the difficulty remains, since the Purusha is held to be inactive.

अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च

aṅgitvānupapatteśca

And because no relation of principal and subordinate is possible among the three gunas when they are in balance, so creation could not begin.

अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात्

anyathānumitau ca jñaśaktiviyogāt

Even if pradhana is inferred in another way, the fault remains, because it lacks the power of intelligence needed to create.

विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम्

vipratiṣedhāccāsamañjasam

And because of its internal contradictions, the Sankhya system is incoherent.

महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्

mahaddīrghavadvā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām

Against Vaisheshika: just as, in their view, the great and long arise from the short and the infinitesimal, so the world may arise from conscious Brahman; their own theory is no better grounded.

उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः

ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ

In either case, whether the first motion of atoms has a cause or not, motion is impossible, so the joining of atoms and creation cannot take place.

समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः

samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyādanavasthiteḥ

And because accepting samavaya (inherence) as a link leads to an endless regress, since samavaya itself would need another link.

नित्यमेव च भावात्

nityameva ca bhāvāt

And because activity or inactivity would be permanent in the atoms, so neither creation nor dissolution could occur.

रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात्

rūpādimattvācca viparyayo darśanāt

And because atoms, having colour and other qualities, would be the opposite of eternal and subtle, as is seen with all things that have qualities.

उभयथा च दोषात्

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

And because there is a fault either way, whether atoms are given more qualities or fewer.

अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा

aparigrahāccātyantamanapekṣā

And since the atomic theory is not accepted by the wise in any part, it is to be wholly disregarded.

समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः

samudāya ubhayahetuke'pi tadaprāptiḥ

Against the Bauddha realists: even granting aggregates arising from the two causes (atoms and the skandhas), their coming together is impossible without a conscious agent.

इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात्

itaretarapratyayatvāditi cennotpattimātranimittatvāt

If it is said the chain of dependent origination, each link causing the next, explains it, no: each link only causes the origin of the next, not the coming together of aggregates.

उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्

uttarotpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt

And because, in their momentary view, the earlier moment ceases when the later one arises, so the earlier cannot be the cause of the later.

असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा

asati pratijñoparodho yaugapadyamanyathā

If an effect arises without a cause, their own premise is contradicted; if cause and effect exist together, momentariness is given up.

प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात्

pratisaṃkhyāpratisaṃkhyānirodhāprāptiravicchedāt

Neither deliberate nor natural cessation is possible, because the series of moments is never broken.

उभयथा च दोषात्

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

And because there is a fault either way: if cessation comes from knowledge, their teaching that it is causeless fails; if spontaneously, their path is useless.

आकाशे चाविशेषात्

ākāśe cāviśeṣāt

And akasha cannot be a mere non-entity, since it is no different from earth and the rest in being experienced as a real thing.

अनुस्मृतेश्च

anusmṛteśca

And because of memory: one who remembers must be the same as the one who experienced, so the self cannot be momentary.

नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्

nāsato'dṛṣṭatvāt

Existence does not come from non-existence, since that is never seen; a sprout comes from a seed, not from its destruction.

उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः

udāsīnānāmapi caivaṃ siddhiḥ

And if it were so, even the idle would gain their ends without effort, since results would come from nothing.

नाभाव उपलब्धेः

nābhāva upalabdheḥ

Against Vijnanavada: external objects are not non-existent, because they are perceived as outside the knower.

वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्

vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat

And because waking differs in nature from dream; waking experience is not like dream.

न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः

na bhāvo'nupalabdheḥ

The existence of mental impressions (vasanas) is not possible in their view, because without external objects they would not be experienced.

क्षणिकत्वाच्च

kṣaṇikatvācca

And because the store-consciousness (alaya-vijnana), being momentary, cannot hold impressions.

सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च

sarvathānupapatteśca

And because it is untenable in every way. With this the Shunyavada too is set aside.

नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्

naikasminnasambhavāt

Against the Jainas: contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot belong to one thing at the same time.

एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम्

evaṃ cātmākārtsnyam

And in the same way the soul would not be all-pervading, since it would take the size of each body it enters.

न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः

na ca paryāyādapyavirodho vikārādibhyaḥ

Nor is the difficulty removed by saying the soul gains and loses parts in turn, because it would then be subject to change and the rest.

अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः

antyāvasthiteścobhayanityatvādaviśeṣaḥ

And since the soul's size at final liberation is permanent, its earlier sizes too must be permanent, so there is no difference in size at all.

पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात्

patyurasāmañjasyāt

The view that the Lord is only the efficient cause, separate from matter, is untenable. Shankara applies this to Pashupata and like schools; other acharyas read it against any purely inferred Lord.

सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेश्च

sambandhānupapatteśca

And because no relation is possible between such a Lord and pradhana or souls, being all separate and without parts.

अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च

adhiṣṭhānānupapatteśca

And because the Lord could not rule over pradhana, which lacks form and is not perceived, as a potter works clay.

करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः

karaṇavaccenna bhogādibhyaḥ

If it is said he rules pradhana as the soul rules the senses, no: then he too would be subject to enjoyment and its fruits.

अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा

antavattvamasarvajñatā vā

Then he would either be finite or not all-knowing.

उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात्

utpattyasambhavāt

The origin of the individual soul is impossible, so any view holding that the jiva is born is not accepted. Acharyas differ here: Shankara reads 42 to 45 as partly refuting the Pancharatra, Ramanuja and Madhva as upholding it.

न च कर्तुः करणम्

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam

Nor can an instrument, the mind, arise from an agent, the soul, as is never seen. Its sense in this adhikarana is read differently by the acharyas.

विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ

Or, if those forms are held to be knowledge itself and the Lord himself, then there is no objection to the view.

विप्रतिषेधाच्च

vipratiṣedhācca

And because of contradictions. Shankara takes this as a further fault in that system; Ramanuja and Madhva read it as rejecting contradictions alleged against it.