Chapter 1: Objections from Smriti and reason answered
इति प्रथमः पादः
37 verses · 1 of 4
What happens in this chapter
Objections from Smriti and reason answered
The second adhyaya defends the teaching against objections. If Brahman is the cause, the Smriti of Kapila would have no place; Badarayana answers that rejecting Brahman would leave the many other Smritis without a place. Brahman and the world differ in nature, conscious and unconscious, yet this does not disprove causality, and reasoning alone cannot overturn the Shruti. Cause and effect are not different, as pots are only clay: this is the arambhana adhikarana. Brahman creates without tools or helpers, as milk turns into curd and devas create by will. The charges of partiality and cruelty fail, since beings receive according to their karma, and samsara has no beginning. All the qualities a cause needs are found in Brahman.
If it is said that taking Brahman as the cause leaves no room for the Smriti of Kapila (Sankhya), no: rejecting Brahman as cause would leave no room for other Smritis, such as Manu's, which teach it. The adhyaya opens by meeting objections from Smriti.
And because the other categories of that Smriti, such as pradhana as an independent cause, are not found in the Veda or in experience. So the Sankhya Smriti is not authority where it departs from Shruti.
By this the Yoga Smriti is also answered. Its practice is accepted, but where it holds pradhana to be the independent cause of the world, it is set aside like Sankhya.
The opponent argues: Brahman cannot be the cause of this world, because the world is unlike it in nature, being insentient and impure; and Shruti itself shows the world as such. This is the objection from difference of nature.
Where Shruti says earth spoke or the waters thought, it refers to the presiding deities of those elements, as is clear from the special mention and from their entering. So the objector holds the world remains insentient.
But it is seen in the world that unlike things arise from one another, as hair and nails from a living man and insects from dung. So difference of nature does not stop Brahman from being the cause.
If it is said that then the effect did not exist before its origin, no: this is only a denial that it existed apart; the effect always exists as one with its cause.
The objector says: at dissolution, when the effect returns into the cause, the cause would be tainted by the effect's defects, so the doctrine is incoherent.
Not so, for there are examples: clay pots, when broken back into clay, do not pass their shapes to the clay. The cause is not tainted by the effect merging into it.
Reasoning has no firm footing, as one thinker refutes another. If it is said we should reason in another way, even so liberation could not be reached by it. So in matters beyond the senses Shruti is the final authority.
If it is said that, the enjoyer becoming one with the enjoyed, their distinction would vanish, the answer is that it can remain, as in the world: waves and foam stay distinct though all are the sea.
The effect is non-different from the cause, as shown by the word 'arambhana' (a mere name arising from speech) in the clay example of the Chandogya, and by other texts. Acharyas read this non-difference in their own ways.
Also from reasoning, since only curd comes from milk, and from another Shruti text that speaks of Sat as the source. So the effect pre-exists in the cause.
The objector says: since the Self is declared to be Brahman, the creator would be at fault for not doing good to himself, creating sorrow for his own self.
And as with stones and the like, some precious and some common though all from earth, so the objection does not hold. Variety in effects does not prove variety in the one cause.
But it is not so, on the strength of Shruti, which says both that Brahman becomes the world and that it remains beyond it; since Brahman is known only from the Word, this must be accepted.